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Informed analysis of events in and around the DPRK
Reliability is in the Eye of the Beholder: The Value of North Korea’s Freeze on Further ICBM Flight Testing By Vann H. van Diepen July 25, 2019
North Korea has conducted a total of three apparently successful flight tests of its two intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) but has observed a unilateral moratorium on long-range ballistic missile tests since early 2018. By the traditional missile development and deployment standards of the US, the Soviet Union/Russia, and even China, one or two tests of an ICBM (even if successful) would
not establish sufficient confidence in effective wartime operation for deployment as part of the North’s highly critical nuclear deterrent. Rather, these countries have historically conducted from one dozen to three dozen tests of an ICBM system before deployment. The contrast between DPRK claims and these standards raises three key questions that this article will explore:
Would North Korea really have deployed nuclear-armed ICBMs based on the current amount of flight testing?
How reliable could such an ICBM force be, and what value could it provide?
Does an ICBM flight-test moratorium or a future negotiated flight-test ban have value if North Korea has already deployed ICBMs?
Read on at 38 North
A Republican Paradigm Shift on North Korea: Prospects and Implications By Ferial A. Saeed July 26, 2019
One of the most consequential shifts in American foreign policy may occur sometime before the 2020 election. Conditions are ripe for a Republican president to strike a deal that could substantially reduce but not eliminate the North Korean nuclear threat. Republican acceptance of such a deal, even as an “initial” agreement with the promise of more to come, would undo a few decades of
bipartisan orthodoxy requiring the irreversible denuclearization of North Korea.
Altering the Republican platform along these lines would be significant. It could also pave the way, potentially, for a paradigm shift in favor of negotiating with hostile states to address specific threats, rather than treating the regimes that govern them as the fundamental problem to be solved. That would mark a dramatic change in US foreign policy but it would be consistent with the preferences of a majority of American voters wary (and weary) of confrontational approaches leading to costly, open-ended military entanglements they feel have failed to serve US interests. It would also enhance America’s strategic position and options in a rapidly evolving international system that the United States may eventually no longer dominate. US-DPRK nuclear talks are heading in a direction conducive to these major policy
shifts.
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Informed analysis of events in and around the DPRK
North Korea’s Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site: No Change in Status A 38 North exclusive with analysis by Frank V. Pabian and Jack Liu July 19, 2019
Commercial satellite imagery from early July indicates that, while the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site has not been abandoned, there is no activity around the test tunnels (portals) or Command Center.
Read on at 38 North
North Korea’s Koryolink: Built for Surveillance and Control By Martyn Williams July 22, 2019
Eavesdropping and network security were the top concerns of the North Korean government in the months before Koryolink, the country’s current mobile network service, was launched in December 2008, according to minutes of a May 28, 2008 meeting in Kuala Lumpur between engineers from the Korea Posts and Telecommunications Co. (KPTC) and Orascom Telecom which have been seen by 38 North. Despite
being a technical-level meeting, the building of sufficient network surveillance capabilities was of such great importance to the regime that even Ri Su Yong (also known as Ri Chol or Ri Tcheul)[1], then the DPRK’s representative to the United Nations in Geneva, was in attendance. At that time, it was clear that if the regime was going to attempt reintroducing telecommunications technology to the North Korean people, tight controls were needed to ensure it would not be used in subversive ways. Working together with Chinese technology companies, KPTC and Orascom created one of the most restrictive cellular environments in the world.
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Informed analysis of events in and around the DPRK
North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Center: Minimal Activity Observed A 38 North exclusive with analysis by Frank V. Pabian, Jack Liu and Jenny Town August 2, 2019
Commercial satellite imagery of North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center through late July indicates operations have likely continued at the Uranium Enrichment Plant (UEP), while normal vehicular movements and dredging of the Kuryong River continues near the reactors.
Read on at 38 North
US-DPRK Negotiations: Time to Pivot to an Interim Agreement By Robert Einhorn August 2, 2019
If and when US-DPRK working-level talks resume, as agreed by US President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un at their brief June 30 meeting at the Demilitarized Zone, prospects for overcoming the current impasse will depend heavily on whether the Trump administration is now prepared to recognize that the North is unwilling, at least at the present time, to give up its nuclear weapons—and
whether, as a result, the administration is now prepared to consider an agreement that imposes significant constraints on DPRK capabilities but falls short of requiring complete denuclearization in an agreed time frame.
Read more at 38 North
Facing the Tuberculosis Crisis in North Korea: The Humanitarian Work of the Eugene Bell Foundation By Avram Agov July 31, 2019
Among the healthcare problems facing North Korea, tuberculosis (TB) is one of the most perilous. In 2017, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported some 131,000 cases of TB in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), with some 16,000 individuals succumbing from the disease in the same year. The WHO also assesses that there were 5,200 new cases of multidrug-resistant TB
(MDR-TB) in North Korea in 2017, but this figure is most likely underestimated. This illustrates a worrisome upward trend in MDR-TB incidence rates in North Korea (for example, in 2013, there had been only 3,500 new cases). The Eugene Bell Foundation (EBF, or the Foundation) stands out as the lone nongovernment organization (NGO) providing TB treatment in any form to the DPRK on a continuous basis, though several South Korean NGOs have sent medications in the past. The primary target of the EBF’s program is the treatment of MDR-TB, and it treats roughly one out of every ten North Koreans who have this more severe strain of TB. The Foundation’s humanitarian work has faced numerous difficulties and challenges in managing its treatment program, but it has also demonstrated a successful and consistent pattern of working with government and business institutions of different countries
amidst the volatile political environment on the Korean Peninsula.
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Informed analysis of events in and around the DPRK
US-DPRK Negotiations: Time to Pivot to an Interim Agreement By Robert Einhorn August 2, 2019
If and when US-DPRK working-level talks resume, as agreed by US President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un at their brief June 30 meeting at the Demilitarized Zone, prospects for overcoming the current impasse will depend heavily on whether the Trump administration is now prepared to recognize that the North is unwilling, at least at the present time, to give up its nuclear weapons—and
whether, as a result, the administration is now prepared to consider an agreement that imposes significant constraints on DPRK capabilities but falls short of requiring complete denuclearization in an agreed time frame.
Read on at 38 North
Toward a Better Understanding of North Korea’s Cyber Operations By Robert Potter August 5, 2019
The cybersecurity capabilities of the North Korean government are certainly more advanced than a country with such a small economy would traditionally field and should not be underestimated. The commitment of the regime to acquire cybersecurity capacities is consistent with its broader efforts to pursue disruptive technologies such as nuclear, chemical and biological weaponry. While it is assumed
that much of the information on North Korea’s cyber capabilities is classified, there is a large amount on their attacks in the public domain, making it relatively easy to unpack and discuss these capabilities abilities (also known as the Lazarus Group, APT37 or Hidden Cobra). A careful reading of this information suggests that while North Korean cyber operations are broadly reported and studied, they are often treated separately from other issues on the peninsula, increasing the risk that decision makers will produce an incomplete analysis of the strategic environment.
Read more at 38 North
Stimson Center: Innovative Ideas Changing the World
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